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The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a communication system used in automo-
biles to interconnect the electronic components required for critical vehicle operations.
These components are called Electronic Control Units (ECU) and each one exercises
one or more functions within the vehicle. ECUs can provide autonomous safety fea-
tures and increased comfort to drivers but these advancements may come at the
expense of compromised vehicle security. Researchers have shown that the standard
automobile CAN bus can be hacked by 1) compromised authorized ECUs or 2) by
unauthorized devices, or ECUs, that have been physically connected. Physical layer
(PHY) device fingerprinting has emerged as one accepted approach to establishing ve-
hicle security. This work investigates the application of AFIT’s Wired Signal Distinct
Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Fingerprinting using Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) to achieve ECU discrimination. Demonstrations
include 4-Class Cross Lot Discrimination (CLD) assessments with four Toyota Avalon
ECUs with the same part number but different lot numbers as well as 9-Class Like
Model Discrimination (LMD) assessments with nine Toyota Avalon ECUs of the same
make and model as authorized devices. Rogue Arduino, Beagle Board, and CANable
USB to CAN bus adapter are introduced and Rogue Reject Rate (RRR) estimated.
Using WS-DNA features, RRR = 100% for rogue devices presenting false credentials
for both the four class and nine class problem. Specific performance for compromised
authorized ECU access attempts included 98% ≤ RRR ≤ 100% for the 4-class CLD
assessment and 35.2% ≤ RRR ≤100% for the LMD assessment. Additionally, the
Average Percent Correct Classification (%C) benchmark of %C = 90% was achieved
for authorized devices at SNR∆ ≥ -8 dB for the 4-class CLD and at collected con-
iv
ditions (SNRcol) for 9-class LMD assessments. Lastly, a pilot study was conducted
using three CAN transceivers to study the effects of thermal cycling on statistical
fingerprints and device discrimination. First-look discrimination results indicate that
fingerprints do in fact vary with thermal cycling. Results for CAN transceiver ther-
mal cycling include 1) classification in the range of 90% ≤ %C≤ 100% for MDA/ML
models trained at one temperature and tested at another and 2) post-thermal cycling
features at a given temperature being different as the device temperature is cycled
from low-to-high and high-to-low.
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Physical Layer Discrimination of Electronic Control Units Using WS-DNA
Fingerprinting
I. Introduction
This research investigates the discrimination of Electronic Control Units (ECU) in
automobiles via the signals that they transmit and provides a successful demonstra-
tion of the Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) fingerprinting process.
ECUs are electrical devices that work with mechanical components to control every-
thing in an automobile from steering and braking to the windows and radio. The
majority of ECUs required for driving operations are connected to the Controller
Area Network (CAN) bus. The ability to achieve device identification and discrim-
ination could be useful in detecting and even preventing unauthorized access on a
network as well as identifying aging devices. This chapter provides an explanation of
the operational and technical motivation for this research as well as research contri-
bution, the methodology, the scope and assumptions, the research questions pursued,
the support needed for this effort and the document organization.
1.1 Background
An overview of the operational and technical motivation for this research is pro-




As automobiles become more technologically advanced and connected, they be-
come more susceptible to hacking. In 2013, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) funded researchers to hack automobiles to expose security vulner-
abilities [13]. Using a laptop connected to the Internet, the researchers were able to
remotely turn off the engine, activate the windshield wipers and windshield wiper
fluid, and even disable the brakes [13, 20]. Because most vehicles contain electronic
controls and embedded systems on a network, this threat is not limited to automo-
biles but may extend to heavy vehicles, ships, and aircraft.
The technology needed to perform these types of attacks is becoming less com-
plex and more accessible. In 2014, security researchers were able to develop a device
called a CAN Hacking Tool (CHT) that costs less than $20 to make, is as small as
an iPhone, and can be hooked up to a vehicle in as little as five minutes [31]. With
this type of accessibility, the problem becomes more of a reality, not just for a high
profile person, but for anyone driving a vehicle with computer controlled electronic
components. The Center for Cyberspace Research (CCR) is currently investigating
many methods for vehicle cyber security. WS-DNA can provide an additional layer
of security and augment current security research for the CCR.
1.1.2 Technical Motivation.
Identification of rogue devices on a network may be achieved through various ap-
proaches. One approach is to examine the physical layer which consists of the signals
that are transmitted on the CAN bus by the ECUs. Each ECU on the bus transmits
packets, or bursts, of information and each burst that is transmitted has distinct
native attributes (DNA) that are exclusive to the ECU that transmitted the burst;
specifically the physical devices responsible for transmitting electrical signals. This
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DNA is referred to as a fingerprint and previous research used fingerprinting as a way
to discriminate between devices.
One researcher employed a correlation and mean squared error (MSE) approach to
discriminating ECUs but the results were not considered adequate as better classifi-
cation was achieved with a different approach and the fields used to extract statistical
features are not feasible in a realistic CAN environment [8, 30]. More recent research
has utilized neural net classifiers along with fingerprints to achieve device discrimi-
nation with one researcher achieving %C = 98% correct classification of devices [2].
However, all researchers did not use an actual ECU from a vehicle, rather they used
the transceiver chip from an ECU coupled with a simulation board setup or develop-
mental boards such as an Arduino Uno [2, 8].
This research explores a more realistic scenario by using production ECUs, in this
case, Steering Angle Sensors (SAS) from a Toyota Avalon, and also using a machine
learning algorithm to achieve device discrimination. Device discrimination is simply
the ability to distinguish one device from another. This research considers both Cross
Model Discrimination (CMD) (also referred to as Cross Lot Discrimination (CLD)
in this document), defined here as devices with the same purpose or function on
a vehicle but from different manufacturers or lots, and Like Model Discrimination
(LMD), defined here as devices of the same model and manufacturer with different
serial numbers. CMD can be thought of as distinguishing an iPhone from a Samsung
while LMD can be thought of as distinguishing one iPhone from another iPhone. This
thesis explored methods to achieve the maximum correct classification, i.e. correctly
identifying a device by its unique characteristics when presented with a set of multiple
fingerprints from different devices. Additionally, this thesis examined the effects of
temperature variations on statistical fingerprints and device discrimination. Research
contributions are identified in Table 1 as well as previous fingerprinting work. Not
3
identified in Table 1 is the fact that this research is the initial application of WS-DNA
fingerprinting for ECUs.
1.1.3 Methodology - WS-DNA.
Using wired signals to generate fingerprints and achieve device discrimination is
not a new process. The WS-DNA process used for this research was adopted from
[3, 4, 5, 6, 25, 26, 27, 35, 36] and adapted for ECU application under consideration.
Signals were collected from the output of each Steering Angle Sensor (SAS) using
an oscilloscope and post-collection processing was accomplished using MATLAB R©.
The ECUs fingerprints were generated using a MATLAB R© script that calculated the
statistical features of a user selected Region of Interest (ROI). The ROI normally
consists of a non-modulated burst such as a preamble, midamble or postamble [33].
The device fingerprints were compared to a set of training fingerprints and assessed
to determine which training fingerprints the unknown fingerprints looked most like
(classification) using a machine learning algorithm. Fingerprints were also compared
to see how much one device looks like another device (verification) [33]. The two-part
process of classification and verification is called device discrimination. The machine
learning algorithm is given a portion of the known data to train on followed by a
testing phase where the decisions of the algorithm are used for device classification
and verification [33].
1.2 Research Questions
This section presents the research questions pursued in this work.
1. Which field or group of bits in a base frame format ECU can be used for CAN
bus discrimination and which field or group of bits in a base frame format can
be used to attempt to maximize ECU discrimination?
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2. Is it possible to achieve better correct classification than previous researchers
who used base frame format or extended frame format devices?
3. What type of effect does thermal cycling have on devices and on device discrim-
ination?
4. How similar are unauthorized, or “rogue”, devices such as the Arduino Uno or
Beagle Board to authorized ECUs?
Table 1. Research contributions and previous DNA research
Technical Area Previous Work Current Research
Addressed Ref # Addressed Ref #
TD Features X [23, 27, 34, 36, 35, 37, 40] X [25]
SD Features X [9, 10, 34, 40]
GT Features X [33]
CB Features X [4, 6]
Correlation X [18, 19, 30]
Emission Type
Intentional X [21, 23, 27, 34, 36, 35, 37, 40] X [25]
Unintentional X [4, 6, 9, 10]
Burst X [4, 6, 21, 23, 27, 34, 36, 37, 40] X [25]
Continuous X [9, 10] X [25]
Classification/Verification Process
MDA/ML X [4, 6, 9, 10, 23, 27, 34, 36, 37, 40] X
GRLVQI X [23, 33, 34]
RndF X [27]
SVM X [8, 22]
NN X [2, 4, 8, 22]
Classification/Verification Devices
Wireless Devices X [21, 23, 34, 36, 37, 40]
Wired Devices X [2, 4, 7, 8, 22, 24, 27, 29, 36, 35] X [25]
Network Type
CAN Bus X [2, 7, 8, 22, 24, 29] X
Device Type




1.3 Scope and Assumptions
Previous research examined how different cables and different cable lengths af-
fected the fingerprints as well as affected the device discrimination [2]. This is a
valid research effort to explore because different cable lengths and material induce
different attenuation of the signal of interest, but this research is only be focused on
ECU device discrimination. One key assumption in this research is that the ECU will
behave the same as a standalone device as it would while connected to the controller
area network. Another assumption is that all devices of interest for discrimination
on the CAN bus will have the same invariant region containing the same bits and bit
transitions. In this case, devices with different identification numbers should be base
frame format and transmit the same number of data bits.
1.4 Support
The following items were necessary to accomplish signal collection and post col-
lection processing:
• 10 ea Toyota Steering Angle Sensors
• Oscilloscope
• Computer with MATLAB R©
• Ardunio Uno with Seeed CAN shield
• Beagle Board
• CANable USB to CAN adapter
• 3 ea ISO 1050 CAN transceivers
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Funding for this research was provided by CCR at the Air Force Institute of Tech-
nology (AFIT). Experimental support needed for this research was provided by CCR
contractors.
1.5 Document Organization
The remainder of this thesis document is outlined in this section. Chapter 2 re-
views applicable literature related to CAN bus, ECU, device identification and device
discrimination. Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the research method-
ology to include Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprint-
ing as well as WS-DNA. It also includes an explanation of signal collection, post-
collection processing using the Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classification and verification machine learning algorithms. Chapter 4
includes an explanation of the MDA/ML classification and verification results and





Chapter 2 provides an overview of the system under test as well as a background
of research methodology used in Chapter 3. This chapter also covers security vul-
nerabilities associated with the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus and Electronic
Control Units (ECU) as well as previous research to identify or fingerprint devices. A
background on thermal effects on vehicles is also presented. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of the CAN bus with details on the frame formats, the fields, the signal char-
acteristics, and the equipment used to create rogue devices. Section 2.2 is necessary
to understand the best field or group of bits to identify an ECU based on its signal
characteristics. Section 2.3 provides an overview of some of the security vulnerabilities
of the CAN bus and ECUs and Section 2.4 provides an overview of previous research
methodologies related to the security issues associated with the CAN bus. The last
section provides a detailed explanation of Radio Frequency-Distinct Native Attribute
(RF-DNA) as well as Wired Signal-Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) which uti-
lizes the same techniques as RF-DNA. This section also provides as explanation of the
process of device classification which is achieved via Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML). Lastly, this section provides an overview of Device
Verification which covers authorized and rogue device acceptance and rejection.
2.2 Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus
This section provides a brief history of the CAN bus, an overview of the different
message formats, and a description of each field in a CAN message which includes the
Start of Frame (SOF), the Arbitration Field, the Control Field, the Data Field, the
Cyclic Redundancy Check Field (CRC), and the End of Frame (EOF). Additionally,
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this section covers the concept of stuff bits, additional networks in a vehicle, and an
overview of how bits are generated in the physical layer of a vehicle.
2.2.1 History.
CAN Bus is a communication system that was created in the 1980s by Bosch
GmbH to simplify wiring in automobiles [12]. The controller area network is com-
prised of many different devices called Electronic Control Units (ECU) which transmit
and receive critical information across the network such as vehicle speed, engine RPM,
and the angle of the steering wheel. The CAN 2.0 standard is the latest version that
is used on vehicles and transmits data up to 1 Mbps. Figure 1 illustrates the differ-
ent networks that are inside a technologically advanced vehicle. The figure is used
to show that all of the ECUs that are critical to physically driving the vehicle are
located on the CAN bus. The CAN bus has two message formats which are the base
frame and the extended frame formats.
2.2.2 Frame Formats.
The CAN bus employs two types of message formats: base and extended frame
formats. The difference between base and extended is that extended frame format
has two identification, or arbitration, fields. Extended frame also contains a few more
bits that are not relevant to this research. The research will focus on the base frame
format which is shown in Figure 2. This figure illustrates a typical base frame which
includes the Arbitration Field, the Control Field, the CRC Field, and the End of
Frame [12].
9
Figure 1. Various networks inside of a technologically advanced vehicle [31].
Figure 2. Breakdown of complete CAN frame, or message, from an ECU [16].
2.2.3 Start of Frame.
The Arbitration Field is preceded by the Start of Frame (SOF) bit which signifies
that an ECU is about to transmit information and the SOF is always a dominant
bit. The Arbitration Field is composed of an 11 bit identifier that signifies which
ECU on the network is transmitting and establishes the priority of the ECU on the
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bus. Since any ECU can transmit at any time, the arbitration is based on the highest
priority message. The ECU with the lower identifier number has the highest priority
and wins the arbitration. The arbitration protocol is used when more than one ECU
is transmitting at the same time, also called a collision, and an example of how
arbitration works on the CAN bus is shown in Figure 3 [12].
2.2.4 Control Field.
The Control Field is comprised of the ID extension bit and a Reserved bit which
are always dominant bits. These bits are followed by the Data Length Code (DLC)
which determines how many bits will be transmitted in the data field.
2.2.5 Data Field.
The Data Field is comprised of zero to 64 bits of information and is the field
that contains the message that is broadcast to all ECUs on the CAN bus. The bits
transmitted in this field vary from message to message [12].
2.2.6 Cyclic Redundancy Check Field.
The CRC Field is a 15 bit field intended to preserve the integrity of the data
that was transmitted. The bits in this field are generated based on the bits that are
transmitted in the data field. Following the CRC are the CRC delimiter, the Acknowl-
edgement (ACK) slot, and the ACK delimiter. These bits are always transmitted as
Figure 3. An example of how arbitration works on the CAN bus. ECU 1 has a lower




2.2.7 End of Frame.
The End of Frame consists of seven consecutive recessive bits that signify the
end of transmission for an ECU. The EOF is the only field that can transmit more
than five consecutive identical bits. If more than five consecutive recessive bits are
transmitted in another field, an error occurs on the CAN bus. Following the EOF
are the Interframe Spacing bits. There are at least three consecutive recessive bits
which represent the idle time on the CAN bus between messages and allows for SOF
synchronization [12].
2.2.8 Stuff Bits.
Stuff bits are bits that are automatically injected into a frame from the sender
when more than five consecutive ones or five consecutive zeros are sent both to ensure
synchronization and to let the receiver know that an error is not present in the field
or message [12]. The total number of bits transmitted increases based on the number
of stuff bits added.
2.2.9 Additional Networks.
There are additional networks that exist on vehicles now such as the Local Inter-
connect Network (LIN) and the Media-oriented System Transport (MOST). These
networks also provide access for an attack but are not included in this research [2].
2.2.10 Physical Layer.
The CAN transceiver is a device within an ECU that converts bits (ones and
zeros) into CAN logical signals which are called CAN-Hi and CAN-Lo. The CAN-
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Hi and CAN-Lo outputs work on a Non Return to Zero (NRZ) differential voltage
protocol. The CAN-Hi and CAN-Lo output voltages are 2.5 volts when the ECU is
idle or transmitting a one, but the CAN-Hi voltage is increased to 3.5 volts and the
CAN-Lo is decreased to 1.5 volts when a zero is being transmitted. The difference
between the voltage outputs is then approximately 2 volts and represents a logical
0, whereas when both CAN-Hi and CAN-Lo are 2.5 volts, the difference is zero volts
which represents a logical 1 [12]. An example of the differential voltage is shown in
Figure 2.
2.2.11 Rogue Devices.
The rogue devices used for this research are devices that are commonly used to
emulate ECUs as well as simulate a CAN bus. The first rogue device was an Arduino
Uno with a Seeed CAN shield. The Arduino Uno is a development board that uses
a ATmega328 microcontroller and has a wide range of applications including simu-
lating ECUs. This device was used in previous research to simulate ECUs for device
discrimination [2, 1, 8]. The second rogue device was a Beagle Board development
board called BeagleBone Black which utilized a locally manufactured shield coupled
with an IS0 1050 CAN transceiver. The BeagleBone uses an Arm Cortex processor
and also has a wide range of applications including ECU simulation [11]. The IS0
1050 CAN transceiver is an eight pin Texas Instrument chip that has a wide range
of applications from transportation, HVAC, medical, etc [38]. The transceiver can
send data up to 1 MBPS and is rated for ambient temperature operation from -55 ◦C
to 105 ◦C [38]. The last device used was a CANable USB to CAN adapter. The
CANable is a device that can be connected to a CAN bus to monitor message traffic
but it can also be programmed to act as an ECU and send messages at speeds of up
to 1 MBPS [17].
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2.3 Security Vulnerabilities
CAN bus vulnerability has been considered by several groups, including researchers
at the University of Washington (UW) as well as by security researchers Miller and
Valasek. UW researchers were able to prove that a vehicle can be hacked wirelessly
through access points such as On-Star. Miller and Valasek initially hacked an auto-
mobile via physical access to the dashboard but were also able to remotely hack an
automobile and do things such as turn on the windshield wipers and windshield wiper
fluid, activate the brakes, and disable the engine [13, 20, 14].
Additional technology such as the CAN Hacking Tool (CHT) exists that utilizes
physical access within a vehicle to give hackers remote access [31]. Physical access
can provide the ability for hackers to remotely control the vehicle as seen in [13]. As
previously mentioned, these devices can be created for as little as $20, making these
devices very accessible.
2.3.1 Thermal Effects.
Automobiles, and therefore ECUs, experience a wide range of temperature vari-
ations throughout their life cycles from normal weather patterns and operation of
the vehicle. In a study of temperature variations in parked vehicles, it was found
that the cabin temperature and trunk temperature experience much higher tempera-
ture variations compared to the outside air temperature fluctuations. During a nine
day experiment, although air temperature varied approximately 15 ◦C, the trunk
temperature experienced an approximately 20 ◦C change and the cabin temperature
experienced as much as 40 ◦C variations [15].
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2.4 Related Work
There have been various methodologies employed to create intrusion detection
systems or establish security on a CAN bus. The review of related work is limited
to previous methods to fingerprint ECUs in order to identify rogue or malfunctioning
devices [2, 7, 8, 22, 30]. Early attempts at ECU classification or discrimination em-
ployed a mean squared error (MSE) and convolution approach. The MSE approach
used the fingerprints as the reference data or training data and compared a new set
of unknown fingerprints to the reference fingerprint. A low MSE value means that
the unknown fingerprints are similar to a set of reference fingerprints and a high MSE
value means that the unknown fingerprints are not similar to the reference finger-
prints. For the convolution approach, the reference fingerprints were convolved with
each set of unknown fingerprints. The maximum value of the convolution was used
to determine “signal similitude” which appears to mean that the method is similar
to correlation. The results according to the confusion matrices indicate that they
achieved correct classification of 90 ≤ %C ≤ 100% [30].
A vastly different approach was used by [7] which involved using the internal clock
of ECUs to identify the transmitting ECU. Fingerprints for this method were gener-
ated by using the clock offset, the clock frequency, and the clock skew. The researchers
created fingerprints based on these variables and used a recursive least squares al-
gorithm to model the behavior of the clocks of each ECU. A device called the CAN
Intrusion Detection System (CIDS) was developed to install within a vehicle to detect
malicious activity. CIDS uses a correlation between clock offsets in received messages
to identify ECUs. The methods used by these researchers produced a minimum of
approximately 97% probability of detection with a maximum of approximately 40%
probability of false alarm according to the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve presented. These metrics are similar to RF-DNA verification metrics which are
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covered in the next section.
The majority of the fingerprinting methodologies used the statistical properties
of a signal together with machine learning or neural net classifiers to identify unique
attributes within the extracted features [2, 8, 22]. [2] used a CAN transceiver and
development board setup to simulate the CAN bus and ECU, [8] utilized CAN Boards
connected on a physical network to simulate various ECUs and the CAN bus while
[22] plugged a device directly into the On Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) port on a
vehicle to accomplish signal acquisition. The three different methods of signal col-
lection coupled with similar methods of fingerprint generation and neural network
classifiers produced a maximum correct classification of %C = 98.6% , %C= 96.5%,
and %C = 86% respectively [2, 8, 22].
2.5 Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) is a device discrimination
and classification methodology developed by AFIT to aid in detection of rogue devices,
identification of aging devices, or augmentation of bit level security [3, 33, 36, 40].
Signals are collected intentionally and unintentionally from the RF emissions of de-
vices. Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) fingerprints of the emissions are generated by
looking at the statistical features of the amplitude, frequency or phase of the signals
[3, 9, 28, 26, 33, 36, 39].
2.5.1 Time Domain (TD) Fingerprinting.
Time Domain (TD) Radio Frequency fingerprints are generated by utilizing the
instantaneous responses of a signal which include the Instantaneous Amplitude (IA),
the Instantaneous Frequency (IF) and the Instantaneous Phase (IP). A real valued
signal must be broken up into I-Q samples via the Hilbert Transform [3] which for a
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discrete real valued signal, s(k), produces s(k) = sQ(k) + sI(k) where the amplitude


















The TD features are normalized and centered by subtracting the mean of the respec-
tive feature and dividing the total by the maximum value of the respective feature.
















The ROI is divided into equal subregions, NR, and typically the ROI is included as
a subregion to produce a total of NR + 1 subregions for statistical feature extraction
[3]. The typical features that are extracted include standard deviation (σ), variance
(σ2), skewness (γ) and kurtosis (κ). These statistics are calculated for a subregion
to generate one fingerprint FRFi . Each regions fingerprints are concatenated to form
the composite fingerprint FRF . The fingerprints can be represented by the following
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equations
FRFRFi = [σRi , σ
2
Ri
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The features that are included in an RF-DNA fingerprint are made up of the num-
ber of responses, Nresp, the number of statistical features, Nstat, and the number of
subregions, NR. For example, if Nresp = 12, Nstat = 3 and NR = 9 then the number
of features Nfeat = 12 × 3 × 9 = 324 features [3]. An example of the regional and
composite fingerprint generation process is shown in Figure 4.
2.5.2 MDA/ML.
Device fingerprints are compared using a classifier called Multiple Discriminant
Analysis Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML). Multiple Discriminant Analysis is a di-
mensionality reducing algorithm that takes the extracted features, or fingerprints,
and reduces them to NC = ND-1 classes, where ND is the number of devices. The
Figure 4. Example of feature extraction used to generate fingerprints for RF-DNA [3].
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maximum likelihood classifier is based on an assumption that the data has a Gaussian
distribution and assumes equal priors and uniform costs. The classifier compares each
testing fingerprint to every set of training fingerprints available to make a classifica-
tion decision [33].
2.5.3 Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).
MDA is an extension of Fischer’s Linear Discriminant analysis that uses ND-1
classes instead of two classes [33]. The primary purpose of MDA within the RF-DNA
methodology is to decrease the intra-class variance and increase the inter-class means.










Pi(µi − µ0)(µi − µ0)T (11)
where C is the number of classes, Pi is the prior probability of the class ci, and Σi is the
covariance matrix [3]. These calculations are based on the assumption of equal costs
and equal prior probabilities which means that the cost for incorrectly classifying
ECU1 is the same cost as incorrectly classifying ECUN . Equal prior probabilities
means that the probability that ECU1 is present is the same as the probability that
ECUN is present. Equations 10 and 11 are used to create a projection matrix W . The
eigenvectors that produce Wbest, the best combination of minimized intra-class spread
versus maximized inter-class mean distance, are used along with the mean vector µW




The ML estimator is based on the Bayesian posterior probability and the assump-
tion that the data has equal prior probabilities as well as uniform costs. The estimator
is also based on the assumption that the data is normally distributed. An unknown
fingerprint F is assigned to class ci where i ranges from 1 to the number of classes, Nc.
The conditional probability P (ci|F ) is the probability that the unknown fingerprint
belongs to ci. The Bayes’ probability is then calculated using
P (ci|F ) =
P (F |ci)P (ci)
P (F )
(12)
where P (ci) is the probability that class ci is present and P (F ) is the probability
that the fingerprint F is present. Since we assume equal priors, P (ci) and P (F ) are
constants and remain the same regardless of class or fingerprint. Because they are
constant, these terms can be ignored, reducing Equation 12 to
P (ci|F ) = P (F |ci). (13)
The value for the remaining probability is calculated using the multivariate Gaussian
equation










(F − µi)T (ΣW )−1(F − µi). (14)
The results of this equation produce the values that are used to determine the correct
classification percentage which is the number of correctly identified testing fingerprints
divided by the total number of fingerprints available.
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2.5.5 Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute Fingerprints.
Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Fingerprinting is an extension
of RF-DNA that uses the same methodology to generate fingerprints and for device
classification and verification. The only difference between RF-DNA and WS-DNA is
the method used for signal acquisition. WS-DNA signals are collected from the wires
of a device whereas RF-DNA signals are collected from the RF emissions transmitted
in the environment. One advantage that WS-DNA has over RF-DNA is that the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the collected signals is typically higher than the signals
collected using RF receivers [36].
2.5.6 Cross Validation.
A K-Fold cross validation process is also used to increase the reliability of the
MDA/ML classifier. First, this process partitions the data into K equal parts. Then,
one of the blocks is held out and K-1 blocks are used for training and the block that
is held out is used for testing. This process is repeated until all K blocks are held out
and tested. The projection matrix that produces Wbest, the projection matrix that
was previously explained in Section 2.5.2, is then used in the MDA/ML process for
testing [3].
2.5.7 Device ID Verification.
Device verification is achieved by comparing one set of fingerprints to another set
of fingerprints to assess how similar the devices are. During the verification process,
a measure of similarity is chosen. From this measure of similarity, a test statistic
ZV is established. From this test statistic, a Probability Mass Function (PMF) is
generated and a decision threshold tV (d) is established. This threshold is established
based on the user selected acceptance and rejection rates during the training phase
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of verification. During testing, an unknown set of fingerprints are presented and test
statistics are generated. The test statistics are compared to the threshold tV (d) and
the device is either accepted (rightly or wrongly) or rejected (rightly or wrongly) [3].
The intent is to observe how much a device looks like itself or others in an attempt to
detect rogue devices attempting to mimic authorized devices. An error occurs when
an authorized device is rejected and when a rogue device is accepted. Results from
the verification process are presented as
• True Verification Rate (TVR)- The percentage of authorized device attempts
accepted as an authorized device over the total number of attempts
• False Verification Rate (FVR) - The percentage of rogue device attempts ac-
cepted as an authorized device over the total number of attempts
• Rogue Rejection Rate (RRR) - Total number of rogue attempts rejected versus
total number of attempts
• Rogue Acceptance Rate (RAR) - Total number of rogue attempts accepted
versus the total number of rogue attempts
and graphically will be shown on a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.


















Based on the literature review of [2, 8, 22], extracting the statistical features of
a signal coupled with using a machine learning or neural network approach are the
best methods to achieve greater than 90% device discrimination. While the general
methods of [2, 8, 22] are understood, the exact details of the statistical features used
are somewhat vague. The process for statistical feature extraction is very clear in
[3, 9, 28, 33, 36, 39] and the process of WS-DNA has not been applied to ECUs on a
CAN bus. WS-DNA was used because it offers a very clear methodology and served
as an equivalent comparison to the methods used and results achieved by [2, 8, 22].
Details on the methodology for WS-DNA are presented in Chapter 3.
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III. Methodology
Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the implementation of the Wired
Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) methodology presented in Chapter 2.
Section 3.1 presents the device under test for this research and Section 3.2 presents the
experimental hardware setup and collection process. Section 3.3 provides the thermal
cycling methodology. Section 3.4 presents the signal Burst Extraction methodology
and Section 3.5 details the Region of Interest (ROI) selection and the subregion
selection. Section 3.5 explains the pre-fingerprint generation filter type and filter
bandwidth selection. Lastly, Section 3.6 presents the Multiple Discriminant Analysis
Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) parameters that were used for device classification
and verification as well as provides examples of MDA/ML results.
3.1 Device Under Test
The Device Under Test (DUT) for this research was a Toyota Avalon Steering
Angle Sensor (SAS) and is pictured in Figure 5. The SAS is a device mounted in the
steering column of the vehicle and reports the current angle of the steering wheel.
This sensor is especially important in vehicles that use autonomous parking and will
likely be one of the more important devices in self-driving vehicles. The components
identified in Figure 5 were designated the Control Unit and the CAN Transceiver
(CAN TRx) and are highlighted here because they may be the subcomponents re-
sponsible for variations in the signals. The first two digits of the Control Unit appear
to correspond to the year that the component was manufactured. SAS 0 and SAS 11
were both obtained from used vehicles and SAS 1 - SAS 10 were all unused devices.
The SAS that was used for this research transmits data at fSAS = 500 kHz and each
frame, if uninterrupted, transmits approximately every 260 µs. To accomplish the
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Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) assessment, a total of NC = 9 classes of the same
part number and same lot number were used and NC = 4 classes of different lot
numbers but the same part number were used for Cross Lot Discrimination (CLD).
Device details are shown in Table 3 and 4 which include the average collected SNR
(SNRC) for all devices.
3.2 Experimental Hardware Setup
This section covers the hardware and hardware settings used in SAS signal collec-
tion. The signals were extracted using a KeySight InfiniiVision MSOX3054T 5.0 GHz
Oscilloscope. The SAS works on a differential voltage and requires two probes to cap-
Table 3. Devices Under Test in NC = 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimination
Lot Device ID Avg SNRC Control Unit CAN TRx
503G 1 SAS 0 42.9 dB 1535 E05 5G3 60G4
823F 2 SAS 1 42.4 dB 1736 E06 7K2 60C8
826I 3 SAS 2 43.5 dB 1802 E03 8B4 613X
523E 4 SAS 11 43.4 dB 1531 E12 5G3 60E7
Avg 43.1 dB
Table 4. Devices Under Test in NC = 9 Class Like Model Discrimination
Lot Device ID Avg SNRC Control Unit CAN TRx
823F 1 SAS 1 42.4 dB 1736 E06 7K2 60C8
823F 2 SAS 3 43.0 dB 1736 E08 7K2 60C8
823F 3 SAS 4 42.6 dB 1736 E08 7K2 60C8
823F 4 SAS 5 42.9 dB 1736 E06 7K2 60C8
823F 5 SAS 6 42.8 dB 1736 E06 7K2 60C8
823F 6 SAS 7 42.7 dB 1736 E06 7K2 60C8
823F 7 SAS 8 42.7 dB 1736 E08 7K2 60C8
823F 8 SAS 9 43.1 dB 1736 E06 7K2 60C8
823F 9 SAS 10 42.7 dB 1736 E08 7K2 60C8
Avg 42.8 dB
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Figure 5. Internal View of Toyota Avalon Steering Angle Sensor (SAS). The ”Control
Unit” and ”CAN Transceiver” are identified for both the older (left) and newer (right)
SAS.
ture both the CAN-Hi and the CAN-Lo signals. The oscilloscope settings used were a
sample rate of fs = 1 GSamp/Sec (GSPS), a horizontal scale of 30 ms/div, a vertical
offset of 0 volts, and a vertical scale of 1 volt/div. To reduce environmental and col-
lection bias, a random permutation of five collections of Nbursts = 200 bursts for each
device were taken over a one week period at various times and various temperatures
as shown in Table 5. All recorded temperatures are in Fahrenheit (F) and were ob-
tained from a thermostat in the CCR lab. To further reduce experimental variability,
each SAS was locked into the same position so that all devices transmitted the same
64 bit message and all devices were powered using the same power supply.
3.3 Thermal Cycling
This section details the methods used to thermally cycle the CAN transceivers
which uses the same setup as Rogue Device 2 with 3 different transceivers used for
this assessment. Thermal cycling was accomplished using two different methods; in
Case 1, the CAN transceiver was 1) at ambient temperature, 2) cooled to approxi-
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Table 5. Random permutation of SAS collections
SAS Date/Time Temp SAS Date/Time Temp SAS Date/Time Temp SAS Date/Time Temp SAS Date/Time Temp
8 9/11 0925 74 11 9/12 0908 74 9 9/13 0920 74 1 9/14 1009 74 4 9/17 1219 74
2 9/11 1005 74 3 9/12 0950 74 7 9/13 1002 74 3 9/14 1118 74 7 9/17 1258 74
3 9/11 1048 74 10 9/12 1031 74 0 9/13 1044 74 9 9/14 1159 73 1 9/17 1339 74
1 9/11 1131 73 8 9/12 1117 74 1 9/13 1126 74 5 9/14 1243 74 5 9/17 1442 75
5 9/11 1210 73 4 9/12 1200 74 6 9/13 1208 74 10 9/14 1333 73 9 9/17 1523 74
6 9/11 1253 73 1 9/12 1241 74 3 9/13 1256 74 8 9/14 1503 73 2 9/17 1603 74
4 9/11 1334 74 0 9/12 1322 75 10 9/13 1339 74 4 9/14 1415 73 8 9/17 1644 74
10 9/11 1437 74 6 9/12 1423 74 5 9/13 1447 74 11 9/14 1626 74 10 9/17 1727 74
9 9/11 1519 74 7 9/12 1505 74 4 9/13 1630 74 7 9/14 1709 73 3 9/18 0737 74
11 9/11 1600 74 9 9/12 1547 73 2 9/13 1713 74 0 9/17 1007 74 11 9/18 0940 74
7 9/11 1642 74 2 9/12 1629 74 8 9/14 0730 74 2 9/17 1058 74 0 9/18 1025 73
0 9/11 1722 74 5 9/12 1716 74 11 9/14 0927 74 6 9/17 1138 74 6 9/18 1108 74
mately 0 ◦C, 3) heated back to ambient, 4) heated to 50 ◦C from ambient, 5) heated
to 75 ◦C from 50 ◦C, 6) cooled to ambient from 75 ◦C. Ambient temperature for these
assessments are ≈ 25 ◦C. These collections are illustrated in Figure 6. Devices were
heated using a Watlow oven and cooled using a common refrigerator operating at a
temperature of approximately 0 ◦C. Additionally, devices were cooled or heated to
ambient temperature by placing them in the CCR lab. Each of the first five collec-
tions involved a 30 minute operating time as well as a 30 minute dwell time at each
Figure 6. Dwell time, Operating time, and temperature for each of the NC = 6 classes
used for Case 1 thermal cycling.
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temperature before collections were made. This was done in an attempt to prevent
thermal shock to the transceivers. Class 6 was collected after one hour of dwell time
at ambient temperature to allow the temperature to gradually drop from 75 ◦C to
approximately 25 ◦C. This class was also collected after a 30 minute operating time
which was used for all classes in order to reach a steady state operation.
For Case 2 thermal cycling, all NC = 3 classes were collected at ambient temper-
ature. Class 1 was collected before heating the CAN transceiver while operating in
ambient temperature conditions. Class 2 was collected after the device was heated
from ambient temperature to 50 ◦C and cooled to ambient temperature as shown in
Figure 7. Class 3 was collected 24 hours after Class 2 while remaining in a temper-
ature controlled environment at ambient temperature. Each of the three classes was
created by collecting Nbursts = 200 bursts five different times between 1600-1700 on
three consecutive days.
Figure 7. Dwell time, Operating time, and temperature for each of the NC = 3 classes
used for Case 2 thermal cycling.
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3.4 Post-Collection Processing
This section provides the details for processing the extracted SAS signals using
MATLAB R© which includes the ROI used for WS-DNA, filter selection, SNR scaling,
and SNR estimation.
3.4.1 Digital Filter.
This section covers the filter used to reduce additive noise before generating fin-
gerprints. The filter was generated using NB = 2 and the MATLAB
R© filtfilt function
resulting in a 4th order baseband Butterworth filter with a bandwidth WBB = 500 kHz
which is approximately the null-to-null bandwidth. Figure 8 is a plot of the Power
Spectral Density (PSD) of a collected signal before the digital filter is applied and
Figure 9 is a plot of the PSD of a collected signal after the digital filter is applied.
3.4.2 Burst Detection and Extraction.
This section details how each of the approximately 1000 bursts were extracted
from each device. Following signal collection, the differential voltage signal for each
steering angle sensor, SSAS was formed by subtracting the CAN-Lo signal from the
CAN-Hi signal. Next, an ideal reference signal, refSig, was generated, as shown
in Figure 10, that corresponded to the symbol rate and bits in the preamble which
includes Start of Frame, the Arbitration Field, and the Data Length Code and has
a total of Nsamp = 40,000 samples. Then, refSig was cross correlated with each




refSig[n]× SSASi [n+m] (15)
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where LSSAS is the length of each signal vector. The MATLAB
R© function findpeaks
was used to find the value that corresponded to the maximum correlation between
refSig and SSAS. Each maximum value corresponded to the last index of the pream-
ble ROI. Because the Data Field could also produce the same bit sequence as the
Figure 8. Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the Steering Angle Sensor (SAS) before
applying digital filter.
Figure 9. Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the SAS after applying digital filter.
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Figure 10. Ideal reference signal used for correlation based burst detection. The
reference signal corresponds to the preamble of the Steering Angle Sensor (SAS).
refSig, findpeaks only extracted data every Nsamp = 128,000 samples. This number
of samples represents the spacing between the end of the Data Length Code and the
end of the Data Field. After each burst was extracted, it was placed in a matrix and
aligned so that the first index of each burst is the first index of the noise region prior
to the Start of Frame.
3.4.3 SNR Scaling.
This section provides an explanation of the necessity of generating multiple noise
realizations for fingerprint generation. Although every effort was taken to reduce the
effects of environmental noise, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is assumed
to be present from the power supply, the oscilloscope, and the collection probes.
However, this noise does not demonstrate the effects of different channel conditions
so different iterations of like-filtered, power-scaled independent AWGN were added
during post-processing to simulate different channel conditions. For this experiment,
noise was added that produced -46 < SNR∆ < 0 decibels (dB) in 2 dB increments,
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where SNR∆ represents the reduction in SNR from collected conditions as the power
of the AWGN is increased. For the purposes of this paper, SNRcol (collected con-
ditions) denotes the SNR where classification performance is statistically equal to
classification performance at SNRC . For the 4-class and 9-class assessments, SNRcol
is the same and is equal to SNR∆ = 0 dB. Additionally, NMC = 5 independent
Monte Carlo noise realizations were generated for each SNR∆. To be clear, SNR was
never improved. Rather, AWGN was added to each burst until the average correct
classification %C ≈ 1/NC .
3.4.4 Region of Interest (ROI).
This section presents the methodology used to identify the ROI which is a section
of the signal that must be consistent and invariant in every burst. Within the SAS
signal, the only fields that are constant in each frame are the Start of Frame, the
Identification Field, the Data Length Code, the End of Frame, and the Interframe
Spacing. Because of the potential for multiple ECUs to transmit simultaneously in
Figure 11. Typical SAS burst with the Region of Interest (ROI) highlighted for Case
A and B.
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the arbitration field, a second ROI was identified for implementation in a realistic base
frame format CAN environment. The ROI that was selected for Case A included the
Start of Frame, the Identification Field, and the Data Length Code. Case B only
included the Remote Transmission Request bit, the ID Extension bit, the Reserved
Bit, and the four Data Length Code bits. Figure 11 illustrates a typical collected base
frame format message, or burst, as well as the selected ROI for Case A and Case B.
3.4.5 Signal-to-Noise Ratio Estimation.
The average collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR), SNRC , was estimated by
taking the ratio of the average power of the ROI (SPow) and the average power of the
noise-like region in the End of Frame and Interframe spacing bits (NPow) resulting in
SNRC ≈ 43 dB and calculated by




The noise was assumed to be Gaussian and the calculation of SPow and NPow only
considered the AC power1. The power calculations are displayed in decibels (dB) and
the results of the estimation are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.
3.5 WS-DNA Fingerprinting
The composite fingerprints FWSC were generated for each Time Domain (TD) ROI
by generating fingerprints in accordance with Section 2.5.1. Fingerprints were gener-
ated for the ideal, collision free environment to 1) assess the WS-DNA classification
and verification performance using an entire invariant ROI and 2) use a comparable
amount of bits to [8] to provide a performance estimate for WS-DNA implementa-
1For WS-DNA implementation, NRZ differential voltage signals should have power calculated
using the variance as a power estimate.
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tion on extended frame format ECUs. This set of fingerprints does not represent
a realistic scenario on the CAN bus for base frame format ECUs because message
collisions occur frequently but these fingerprints could be used to establish a baseline
for ECUs prior to installation on a vehicle. A second set of fingerprints was generated
to address the best ROI for WS-DNA implementation using base frame format ECUs
on the CAN bus in a realistic environment.
3.5.1 Case A - Ideal Collision Free Environment.
Time Domain (TD) WS-DNA fingerprints are generated using the SAS preamble,
which is composed of the Start of Frame, the Arbitration Field, and the Control
Field, as the ROI. Additionally, Nsamp = 210 samples were included before the SOF bit
resulting in the ROI being composed of Nsamp = 40,000 samples. The ROI was further
divided into NR = 54 contiguous subregions each containing Nsamp ≈ 740 samples.
Subregion selection was determined empirically by fixing all fingerprint generation
parameters while varying the number of subregions, NR, and comparing the %C
results. The NR that produced the highest %C was chosen. For results that were
Figure 12. Steering Angle Sensor (SAS) Region of Interest (ROI) for Case A divided
into 54 contiguous subregions.
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statistically equal or indeterminate, the lower NR was used to reduce the total number
of features. The total number of features included in the WS-DNA fingerprints are
composed of the Nresp×Nstats×NR+1, therefore, Nfeats = 3×4×55 = 660 features.
Fingerprints for the Nrg = 3 rogue devices were generated along with the authorized
devices using the same fingerprint generation method. Figure 12 displays the ROI
with the subregions denoted by the red dashed lines.
3.5.2 Case B - Realistic CAN bus environment.
TD WS-DNA fingerprints were generated to address a typical collision envi-
ronment for base frame format ECUs excluding the Start of Frame and Arbitra-
tion Field that were included in Case A. The ROI for this scenario included the
Remote Transmission Request bit, the ID Extension bit, the Reserved Bit, and
the four Data Length Code bits. The ROI was divided in NR = 45 subregions
each containing Nsamp ≈ 306 samples. The total number of features included in
the WS-DNA fingerprints are composed of the Nresp × Nstats × NR + 1, therefore,
Nfeats = 3 × 4 × 46 = 552 features. Figure 13 displays the ROI with the subregions
Figure 13. Steering Angle Sensor (SAS) Region of Interest (ROI) for Case B divided
into 45 contiguous subregions.
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denoted by the red dashed lines.
3.5.3 Rogue Devices.
To assess verification performance of the WS-DNA fingerprints, Nrg = 3 rogue
devices were created to transmit the same bit level preamble as the authorized SAS
devices. An Arduino Uno with a CAN shield, a Beagle Board with an ISO 1050 Can
Transceiver, and a CANable CAN to USB adapter were used to create the rogue
devices. The same, or similar, devices were used in previous research to simulate
ECUs [2, 8]. The average differential voltage of the average SAS is compared to the
average differential voltage of the three rogue devices in Figure 14. On average, the
Beagle Board rogue device had a differential voltage that was 0.2 volts higher than
the SAS and the other rogue devices.
Figure 14. Average ROI differential voltage of all devices
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3.6 Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)
This section provides the methodology for classification and verification of the
fingerprints that were generated in Section 3.5.
3.6.1 Classification.
Nbursts ≈ 1000 WS-DNA fingerprints for all NC = 4 and NC = 9 classes were used
for classification. A total of NNZ = 5 noise realizations were generated resulting in
a total of Nbursts ≈ 5000 bursts that were available for MDA/ML implementation.
Nprints ≈ 2500 were used for MDA/ML model development and Nprints ≈ 2500 were
used for testing. For both the training and testing fingerprints, approximately 2500
interleaved fingerprints from each class were used because collections were taken at
different times and temperatures, and are therefore subject to varying environmen-
tal and collection bias. Following the training phase, the model was validated using
K-Fold Cross Validation. Based on previous work, a value of K=5 was used for K-
Fold Cross Validation [3, 24, 28, 33, 36, 40]. As described previously in Section 2.5,
K-Fold validation partitions the fingerprints into K equal sections and trains on K-1
sections, after which the partition that was held out is tested. This process was re-
peated K times and the best performing model is chosen for the classifier. MDA/ML
classification results are presented graphically as the average percent correct classifi-
cation (%C) for each SNR. Figure 15 displays the average correct classification for a
NC = 4 class problem as SNR is increased via a decrease in the power of the added
AWGN.
3.6.2 Verification.
This section provides an overview of the methodology used to achieve device veri-
fication. The purpose of device verification is to measure device similarity and assess
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Figure 15. MDA/ML classification testing results for NC = 4 class Cross Lot Discrim-
ination (CLD) assessment.
the rate at which a rogue device is accepted or rejected. To measure device simili-
tude, a test statistic ZV is generated based on common features from the testing and
training fingerprints. A probability mass function (PMF) was generated from ZV
of each authorized device and a threshold was established that corresponded with a
True Verification Rate (TVR) > 90% and a False Verification Rate (FVR) < 10%.
An unknown devices’ fingerprints were presented and the same process for generating
a test statistic was applied to these fingerprints. These fingerprints were classified
(rightly or wrongly) based on which side of the threshold they fell on. Verification was
assessed using Euclidean Distance as a measure of similarity and Equal Error Rate
(EER) = 10% as a measure of success. EER is the device dependent metric chosen for
this experiment where the TVR is equal to the Rogue Rejection Rate (RRR). TVR
is calculated as the number of attempts by an authorized device that are correctly
accepted divided by the total number of attempts and RRR is calculated as the total
number of rogue attempts that are correctly rejected divided by the total number of
rogue attempts. Results from the Device Verification process are presented graph-
ically on a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve as a comparison of the
38
TVR versus the FVR and TVR versus RAR where RAR is equal to one minus RRR.
Figure 16 displays results of the MDA/ML verification process for a NC = 4 class
CLD problem. An alternate presentation for the ROC curve is shown in Figure 17.
This stem plot is a burst-by-burst (BbB) assessment used to display the authorized
device verification results [3]. The horizontal black lines denote the device dependent
EER threshold, the red X’s denote access incorrectly denied, and the blue circles
denote access correctly granted.
Rogue device acceptance was measured by using the rogue devices as well as by
using all authorized devices as rogue, or compromised, devices and assessing how often
these devices were accepted when falsely presenting an authorized device’s creden-
tials. These results are also presented graphically as a measure of TVR versus Rogue
Acceptance Rate (RAR). Figure 18 displays an alternate way to present the rogue
assessment results; a burst-by-burst grant/deny access decision. The horizontal black
lines on the plot represent the device dependent EER thresholds that were generated
for each class, the blue circles represent the fingerprints that were correctly rejected,
and the red X’s represent the fingerprints that were incorrectly accepted. In the NC
Figure 16. An example of results of MDA/ML verification for NC = 4 class assessment.
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Figure 17. An example of True Verification results for a NC = 4 class problem. Results
are an alternate presentation of the ROC curve and are presented as a burst-by-burst
grant/deny access assessment.
Figure 18. An example of results from the rogue assessment for a NC = 4 class problem
where Device 4 falsely presents credentials for each authorized device. Results are
an alternate presentation of the ROC curve and are presented as a burst-by-burst
grant/deny access assessment.




This chapter begins with an analysis of the differences between the transition from
a dominant bit to a recessive bit for the authorized devices compared to the rogue
devices. This analysis is presented in Section 4.1 and is vital to the results discussion.
The results of the Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) device clas-
sification and device verification for NC = 4 class Cross Lot Discrimination (CLD)
and NC = 9 class Like Model Discrimination (LMD) are presented in Section 4.2.
Additionally, the results for NC = 6 and NC = 3 class thermal cycling problems are
presented. Lastly, NC = 3 class CAN transceiver classification results are presented
as a first-look assessment of thermal effects on device classification. WS-DNA finger-
printing was implemented in accordance with the methodology described in Section
3.6. Classification results are displayed as average percent correct classification (%C)
for the 1 vs M assessment to determine which device the fingerprints looks most like
and presented in Section 4.2. Device verification is presented as Rogue Rejection
Rate (RRR), Rogue Acceptance Rate (RAR), True Verification Rate (TVR), and
False Verification Rate (FVR) for the 1 vs 1 “looks how much like” assessment and is
presented in Section 4.3. The NC = 4 class and NC = 9 class discrimination results
are presented for the two different ROI’s generated in accordance with Section 3.5.
All results are presented at SNRcol where %C is statistically equal to performance
at the average collected SNR (SNRC)
1. The same range of SNR∆ is used for classi-
fication plots for the 4-class and 9-class assessments to provide a comparison of CLD
and LMD at the same SNRs. Thermal cycling results are presented in Section 4.4
using NC = 6 and NC = 3 class thermal assessments. Additionally, NC = 3 class,
Cross Lot, Cross Temperature classification results are presented in this section.
1SNRcol is approximately 20 dB less that SNRC but all results for SNRcol ≤ %C ≤ SNRC are
statistically equal and were omitted from the classification plots.
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4.1 ECU Transition Misalignment
This section is presented to discuss the symbol rate and transitions of the autho-
rized Electronic Control Units (ECU) compared to the Nrg = 3 rogue devices that
have been used to emulate ECUs [2, 7]. Figure 19 displays an expanded view of the
first transition from a dominant bit to a recessive bit for the average Steering Angle
Sensor (SAS) as well as the Arduino, Beagle Board, and CANable. It is clear that
the SAS reaches a much lower voltage than the rogue devices as it transitions which
provides critical information for discrimination. Also, each of the rogue devices are
not perfectly aligned with the SAS and all rogue devices have a unique ripple effect
as they transition to the recessive bit. The devices continue to transmit at a slightly
different symbol rate for the remainder of the data frame resulting in further mis-
alignment at the end of the Region of Interest (ROI), which can be seen in Figure 19.
These features are likely the reason why rejection rates are high for LMD and CLD
assessment which will be explained in Section 4.3.
Figure 19. Expanded view of the average bit transition from dominant to recessive for
the SAS and Nrg = 3 rogue devices.
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4.2 Device Classification
This section includes the results for the device classification of Toyota Steering
Angle Sensors using WS-DNA and MDA/ML as outlined in Section 3.5. Classification
results are displayed graphically and with confusion matrices for NC = 4, Cross Lot
Discrimination, and NC = 9, Like Model Discrimination. A total of Nbursts ≈ 1000
bursts with Ntrng = Ntest ≈ 500 interleaved fingerprints were used for training and
testing for each device. Furthermore, five like-filtered Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) realizations were generated for each fingerprint per device. This resulted in
Ntrng ≈ 500 × 5 ≈ 2500 fingerprints and Ntest ≈ 500 × 5 ≈ 2500 fingerprints per
device for the Cross Lot Discrimination assessment and Like Model Discrimination
assessment. The AFIT RF-DNA arbitrary benchmark of %C = 90% was used for
the average correct classification measure of success and all results are based on 95%
confidence intervals. For all classification plots, the confidence intervals fall within
the vertical extent of the markers and were omitted for visual clarity.
4.2.1 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimination.
The first experiment was the NC = 4 class CLD problem of steering angle sensors
of the same part number each with a different lot number. The classification results
are presented in Figure 20 where %C = 90% is achieved at SNR∆ ≥ -19 dB for
Case A with the maximum %C ≥ 99% achieved at SNR∆ ≥ -10 dB. Device 3 has
a statistically significant increase in correct classification over all other devices from
SNR∆ ≥ -39 dB to SNR∆ = -14 dB. Upon inspection, Device 3 was verified to have
the newest internal components. The classification results for Device 2 are statistically
equal to the cross class average. A comparison of the the cross class average %C for
Case A (entire preamble) and Case B (No Arbitration Field) is shown in Figure 21.
Case A classification results are statistically better than results from Case B at SNR∆
43
≥ -40 dB. For Case B, %C ≥ 90% is achieved at SNR∆ ≈ -10 dB.
Confusion matrix results are presented in Table 6 as %C Case A (Bold text)/ %C
Case B. There is degraded classification performance when the Arbitration Field is
excluded from the ROI. Classification performance for Device 1 and 4 is reduced by
approximately 5% and classification performance for Device 2 and 3 is reduced by
approximately 2%. Device 1 and 4 were confused the with each other more than with
the other devices. It should be noted that these devices were both obtained from
Figure 20. Results from MDA/ML 4 Class Cross Lot Classification for Case A. %C =
90% is achieved at SNR∆ ≥ -14 dB
Figure 21. MDA/ML Classification Results for Cross Class Average using Case A and
Case B ROI for NC = 4 class CLD
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Table 6. Cross Lot Discrimination Confusion Matrix (%) for NC = 4 classes at SNRcol.
Results are displayed as %C Case A (entire preamble) / %C Case B (no Arbitration
Field).
Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev 3 Dev 4
Dev 1 99.6/93.76 0/1.88 0/0 0.4/4.36
Dev 2 0.04/1 99.6/97.8 0/0.04 0/1.16
Dev 3 0/0.56 0.04/1.04 99.92/97.88 0.04/0.52
Dev 4 0.28/2.76 0.2/1.92 0/0.12 99.52/95.2
used vehicles. As SNR was degraded, Device 1 and 4 were incorrectly classified as
each other more than other devices which may indicate that these devices look more
similar to each other as they age.
The results in this section indicate that > 90% correct identification of similar
components is achievable using WS-DNA fingerprints generated from Case B. Correct
classification (%C) ≥ 90% for realistic implementation can still be achieved even when
SNR is degraded by 10 dB.
Figure 22. Comparison of Cross Class Average for Cross Lot Discrimination and Like
Model Discrimination for Case A and Case B.
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4.2.2 Comparison of NC = 4 Class CLD and NC = 4 Class LMD.
This section provides a direct comparison of the cross class average correct classi-
fication for the Cross Lot Discrimination and Like Model Discrimination. The CLD
results are the same results presented in the previous section and the LMD results
were generated using the arbitrarily chosen Device 1, 2, 6 and 7 from the NC = 9
class assessment. Results for Case A and Case B are presented for both assessments
and shown in Figure 22. CLD results for Case A are statistically better than the
other assessments at SNR∆ > -14 dB. LMD results for Case B are statistically worse
than the other assessments at SNR∆ > -14 dB and this assessment fails to meet the
success criteria of %C ≥ 90%. These results indicate that the WS-DNA fingerprints
generated would not be viable for implementation on the CAN bus if four or more
base frame format devices of the same make and model are present.
4.2.3 9 Class Like Model Discrimination.
9 Class LMD device classification consisted of 9 sensors from lot 823F. The Case
A classification results in Figure 23 are for -46 ≥ SNR∆ ≥ 0 dB with the arbitrary
%C = 90% achieved at SNR∆ ≥ -4 dB based on 95% confidence intervals. Device 2
and Device 7 had statistically better %C than the other seven classes for all SNR∆
above -38 dB and were correctly classified at least 90% of the time at SNR∆ ≥ -20
dB. A direct comparison of classification performance for Case A versus Case B is
presented in Figure 24. Case A has statistically better performance than Case B for
SNR∆ ≥ -32 dB and %C = 90% was not achieved for Case B at any SNR∆ including
collected conditions.
The 9 class LMD confusion matrix results for Case A and Case B are presented
in Table 7 and 8 respectively. Case A has an average %C at this SNR that is ≈ 20%
better than Case B. Device 2 and Device 7 are the best performing devices achieving
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Figure 23. Results from MDA/ML 9 Class Like Model Classification for Case A. %C
= 90% is achieved at SNR∆ ≥ -4 dB.
Figure 24. MDA/ML Classification Results for Cross Class Average using Case A and
Case B ROI for NC = 9 Class Like Model Classification.
%C ≥ 97% for Case A and %C ≥ 85% for Case B. Device 1, 3, 8, and 9 all fail to
achieve %C ≥ 90% for Case A and all fail to achieve %C ≥ 65% for Case B. For both
cases, Device 3 and Device 9 look most like each other and Device 2 and Device 7
look the least like any other device. The differences and similarities of all of these
devices likely result from the subcomponents such as the CAN transceiver and the
Control Unit, which are displayed in Table 2. All devices had the same markings
on the transceiver but there were two different part, or lot, numbers present for the
Control Unit. Device 2 and 7 were both part number 1736 E08 but Device 3 and
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Table 7. Confusion matrix for NC = 9 Class assessment at SNRcol for Case A
Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev 3 Dev 4 Dev 5 Dev 6 Dev 7 Dev 8 Dev 9
Dev 1 86.52 5.4 0 0 3.08 0.12 0 4.88 0
Dev 2 2.12 97.72 0 0.16 0 0 0 0 0
Dev 3 0 0 84.64 0 0 1.04 1.32 0 13
Dev 4 0.2 0.24 0.24 95.28 0 4.04 0 0 0
Dev 5 1.76 0 0 0 92.84 0.04 0 5.36 0
Dev 6 0.88 0 1.28 2.68 0.16 94.08 0 0.12 0.8
Dev 7 0 0 0.88 0 0 0 98.28 0 0.84
Dev 8 5.44 0.08 0 0 6.84 0 0 87.64 0
Dev 9 0 0 20.24 0 0 1.12 1.16 0 77.48
Table 8. Confusion matrix for NC = 9 Class assessment at SNRcol for Case B
Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev 3 Dev 4 Dev 5 Dev 6 Dev 7 Dev 8 Dev 9
Dev 1 57.6 10.44 0.12 4.84 6.96 3.4 0 16.56 0.08
Dev 2 9.12 85.48 0 5.12 0 0 0 0.28 0
Dev 3 0 0 60.32 1.76 0.16 8.2 10.48 0 19.08
Dev 4 4.16 4.6 1.52 74.64 0.04 14.36 0 0.16 0.52
Dev 5 6.48 0.04 0.04 0.12 75.4 3.4 0 14.44 0.08
Dev 6 5.56 0 6.08 9.44 2.28 65.64 0.76 1.84 8.4
Dev 7 0 0 6.88 0 0 0.2 85.52 0 7.4
Dev 8 15.2 1.56 0 0.4 17.4 2.08 0 63.36 0
Dev 9 0 0 21.24 0.32 0.08 11.8 8.96 0 57.6
9 were different part numbers, indicating that another subcomponent, such as the
transceiver, may have been responsible for the confusion.
The NC = 9 class classification results indicate that WS-DNA implementation
using Case A is viable for correctly classifying Like Model devices on the CAN bus
> 90% of the time. If devices do start transmitting more similar signals as they age,
WS-DNA would likely not be effective for properly classifying NC ≥ 9 devices of the
same make and model on the CAN bus.
4.3 Device Verification
Device verification is a one versus one measure of similarity and was assessed
here for authorized and rogue devices for Cross Lot Discrimination and Like Model
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Discrimination. Nrg = 3 rogue devices that were used included an Arduino, a Beagle-
Bone, and a CANable all transmitting the same arbitration ID of a Toyota Steering
Angle Senor as well as each authorized device simulating a compromised device. De-
vice verification was achieved using Euclidean distance test statistic as a measure of
similarity and Equal Error Rate (EER) = 10 % as a measure of success. Devices are
either granted or denied access based on whether the test statistic (ZV ) is greater
than or less than the device dependent threshold (tV (d)). Verification results are
presented at SNRcol.
4.3.1 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimination.
The results for the Authorized Device ID verification are displayed in Figure 25 and
26. Grant/deny access decisions were assessed using Nprints ≈ 2500 fingerprints. The
horizontal black dashed line represents the arbitrary threshold of True Verification
Rate (TVR) ≥ .9 which is consistent with previous RF-DNA work [3, 9, 33, 36,
40]. For both cases, the solid ROC curves indicate that all four devices met the
arbitrary benchmark of TVR ≥ .9 and FVR ≤ .1 at SNRcol. The burst-by-burst TVR
assessment results are presented in Figure 27 and 28 and included for completeness.
The horizontal black lines denote the device dependent threshold set for a training
threshold of TVR = 90%, the red X’s indicate access incorrectly denied, and the
blue O’s denote access correctly granted. TVR results at SNRcol for Case A are
approximately 95% and results for Case B are approximately 91% for the four devices.
The results for the Rogue Device ID verification are presented in Figure 29 and 30.
Rogue ID verification is the process where rogue devices present false credentials and
are either accepted or rejected as the device they are claiming based on the threshold
(tV (d)) established from the PMF. The dashed black box represents the area where
the TVR ≥ .9 and the RAR ≤ .1. The black stars on each line represent the device
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Figure 25. Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimination
(CLD) at SNRcol for Case A using Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity. All
devices achieved True Verification Rate (TVR) ≥ .9 and False Verification Rate ≤ .1.
Figure 26. Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimination
(CLD) at SNRcol for Case B using Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity. All
devices achieved True Verification Rate (TVR) ≥ .9 and False Verification Rate ≤ .1.
dependent EER and the solid curves denote successful verification. For both cases,
all devices successfully met the EER success criteria.
Figure 31 and 32 provide an alternate presentation of the Rogue Device ID veri-
fication. These results are only for rogue devices claiming Device 1’s ID, but results
were consistent for all authorized devices. These verification results are based on
a burst-by-burst grant/deny access criteria [6]. The O’s represent access correctly
50
Figure 27. Device ID Verification stem plots for NC = 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimina-
tion (CLD) at SNRcol for Case A using Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity.
Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for Ntest ≈
2500 authorized attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly denied and blue circles
indicate access correctly granted. The average TVR was approximately 95%.
Figure 28. Device ID Verification stem plots for NC = 4 Class Cross Lot Discrimina-
tion (CLD) at SNRcol for Case B using Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity.
Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for Ntest ≈
2500 authorized attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly denied and blue circles
indicate access correctly granted. The average TVR was approximately 91%.
denied and the X’s indicate access incorrectly granted. The horizontal black lines
are the device dependent EER thresholds which are ≈ 0 on the plots. For Case A,
all rogue devices were denied access for 100% of their attempts as each authorized
device. The RRR results are also 100% for Case B and are presented in Figure 32.
Rogue Device 3 looks less like Device 1 for Case B which is likely attributable to
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the symbol and transition misalignment which can be observed in Figure 19. The
verification results for Device 4 presenting false credentials for all authorized devices
are shown in Figure 33 and Figure 34. Excluding the results for Device 4 presenting
its own credentials, the average RRR is ≈ 100% when a compromised ECU attempts
to present false credentials for Case A. For Case B, the average RRR was approxi-
mately 99%. Overall, Rogue Rejection Rates are high for the unauthorized devices
Figure 29. Rogue Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 4 Class CLD at SNRcol
for Case A using Device 4 and NRg = 3 rogue devices. All devices achieved TVR ≥ .9
and RAR ≤ .1.
Figure 30. Rogue Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 4 Class CLD at SNRcol
for Case B using Device 4 and NRg = 3 rogue devices. All devices achieved TVR ≥ .9
and RAR ≤ .1.
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Figure 31. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A using NRg = 3 rogue devices.
Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for Ntest ≈ 5000
rogue attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and blue circles indicate
access correctly denied. All rogue devices were rejected 100% of the time when falsely
presenting Device 1’s credentials.
Figure 32. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case B using NRg = 3 rogue devices.
Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for Ntest ≈ 5000
rogue attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and blue circles indicate
access correctly denied. All rogue devices were rejected 100% of the time when falsely
presenting Device 1’s credentials.
likely because each device is unable to accurately match the symbol rate resulting
in drastic differences in the transition regions at the nanosecond level as shown in
Figure 19. Although Rogue Device 1 has a higher average amplitude than the other
devices, the bit transitions are more aligned with the SAS than Rogue Device 3 re-
sulting in a higher degree of similarity. Based on the results for the NC = 4 Class
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Figure 33. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A using Device 4 as the rogue
device. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and blue circles indicate access
correctly denied. Device 4 was rejected ≈ 100% of the time when falsely presenting
credentials for Device 1-3.
Figure 34. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case B using Device 4 as the rogue
device. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and blue circles indicate access
correctly denied. Device 4 was rejected ≈ 99% of the time when falsely presenting
credentials for Device 1-3.
CLD assessments shown in Table 9, WS-DNA is a viable method for establishing or
augmenting security on the CAN bus. Unauthorized device attempts were rejected
> 90% of the time even when SNR was degraded by 39 dB and rejected 100% of the
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time when SNR was degraded by 29 dB. Compromised device attempts were rejected
> 90% of the time when SNR was degraded by 14 dB.
Table 9. Average Rogue Rejection Rates (%) for all 4 class rogue assessments at
each SNR∆. 12 unauthorized and 9 compromised rogue rejection assessments were
completed at each SNR∆.
SNR∆(dB) -44 -39 -34 -29 -24 -19 -14 -9 -4 0
Case A
Compromised 55.39 64.03 63.42 73.01 85.24 93.34 98.05 99.50 99.81 99.88
Unauthorized 91.33 99.78 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Case B
Compromised 53.80 54.21 56.08 63.45 72.43 84.48 91.97 96.26 98.71 99.24
Unauthorized 80.29 94.89 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
4.3.2 9 Class Like Model Discrimination.
This section provides the verification results for the NC = 9 Class LMD assessment
at SNRcol (collected conditions). Figures 35 and 36 display the Device ID verification
ROC curves at SNRcol. The dashed lines denote devices that did not achieve the
arbitrary benchmark of TVR ≥ .9 and FVR ≤ .1 and the solid lines denote successful
verification performance. For Case A, all devices met the success criteria but for Case
B, only Devices 2, 4, and 7 met the threshold. Device 2 and 7 were the most dissimilar
devices during device classification and these verification results are consistent with
the classification results. The burst-by-burst TVR assessment results are presented
in Figure 37 and 38 and included for completeness. The horizontal black lines denote
the device dependent threshold set for a training threshold of TVR = 90%, the red X’s
indicate access incorrectly denied, and the blue O’s denote access correctly granted.
TVR results at SNRcol for Case A are approximately 87% and results for Case B are
approximately 80% for the nine devices.
Figures 39 and 40 present the Rogue Device ID verification results when Device 9
and N3 = 3 rogue devices falsely presented credentials for all authorized devices. The
solid curves denote devices that achieved the arbitrary benchmark of TVR ≥ .9 and
RAR ≤ .1 and the dashed curves denote devices that failed to meet the threshold.
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Figure 35. Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 9 Class Like Model Discrimi-
nation (LMD) at SNRcol for Case A. Verification is achieved using Euclidean distance
as a measure of similarity. 9/9 devices met the success criteria of TVR ≥ .9 and FVR
≤ .1.
Figure 36. Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 9 Class Like Model Discrimi-
nation (LMD) at SNRcol for Case B. Verification is achieved using Euclidean distance
as a measure of similarity. Only 3/9 devices met the success criteria of TVR ≥ .9 and
FVR ≤ .1.
Case A results are presented in Figure 39 and indicate that all devices were successful
except Device 3 (dashed curve). Case B results are presented in Figure 40 and show
that Device 3, 6, and 7 did not achieve TVR ≥ .9 and RAR ≤ .1 when Device 9 was
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Figure 37. Device ID Verification stem plots for NC = 9 Class Like Model Discrimina-
tion (LMD) at SNRcol for Case A using Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity.
Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for Ntest ≈
2500 authorized attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly denied and blue circles
indicate access correctly granted. The average TVR was approximately 87%.
Figure 38. Device ID Verification stem plots for NC = 9 Class Like Model Discrimina-
tion (LMD) at SNRcol for Case B using Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity.
Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for Ntest ≈
2500 authorized attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly denied and blue circles
indicate access correctly granted. The average TVR was approximately 80%.
57
falsely presenting the credentials of these devices.
Figure 39. Rogue Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 9 Class Like Model
Discrimination (LMD) at SNRcol for Case A using Device 9 and Nrg = 3 rogue devices.
The black dashed box represents the area where TVR ≥ .9 and RAR ≤ .1. 8/9 devices
were successful for this assessment with the failure (Device 3) denoted by the dashed
curve.
Figure 40. Rogue Device ID Verification ROC curve for NC = 9 Class Like Model
Discrimination (LMD) at SNRcol for Case B using Device 9 and Nrg = 3 rogue devices.
The black dashed box represents the area where TVR ≥ .9 and RAR ≤ .1. 6/9 devices
were successful for this assessment with failures denoted by dashed curves.
The burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for the NC = 9 class LMD veri-
fication are presented in Figure 41 and 42. The device dependent EER thresholds for
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Figure 41. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A using Device 9 as the rogue
device. Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for
Ntest ≈ 5000 rogue attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and blue
circles indicate access correctly denied. 5/9 devices had a RRR ≥ 90% when Device 9
was falsely presenting credentials.
Figure 42. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case B using Device 9 as the rogue
device. Results are presented as a burst-by-burst grant/deny access assessment for
Ntest ≈ 5000 rogue attempts. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and blue
circles indicate access correctly denied. 5/9 devices had a RRR ≥ 90% when Device 9
was falsely presenting credentials.
these stem plots are displayed as the colored circles on the ROC curves for authorized
Device ID verification. As with the NC = 4 class results, the O’s represent devices
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Table 10. Average Rogue Rejection Rates (%) for all 9 class rogue assessments at
each SNR∆. 27 unauthorized and 64 compromised rogue rejection assessments were
completed at each SNR∆.
SNR∆ -44 -39 -34 -29 -24 -19 -14 -9 -4 0
Case A
Compromised 53.20 55.85 56.62 63.33 71.29 83.69 86.63 93.27 94.80 95.57
Unauthorized 88.89 99.55 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Case B
Compromised 52.35 52.37 53.02 56.32 67.32 76.54 80.96 85.87 88.59 89.48
Unauthorized 82.86 94.35 99.95 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
correctly denied access and the X’s indicate devices that were incorrectly granted
access. The dashed horizontal black lines represent the device dependent EER. The
average RRR for Case A is ≈ 91% and the average RRR for Case B is ≈ 85%. Device
3 is the worst performing device and Rogue (compromised) Device 9 is rejected ≈
100% of the time when falsely presenting Device 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8’s credentials for both
cases. Rejection rates for Device 3, 6, and 7 decrease by greater than 20% for Case B
indicating a higher degree of similarity between devices from fingerprints generated
with the shorter ROI.
Consistent with the NC = 4 class CLD problem, all true rogue devices were re-
jected 100% of the time when presenting any of the nine authorized devices creden-
tials. Stem plots are very similar to the NC = 4 class results for Device 1 and are
instead presented here in tabular form in Table 10. Table 10 also presents the average
RRR for all rogue assessments at each SNR∆. On average, unauthorized devices were
rejected ≥ 90% of the time even when SNR was degraded by 39 dB.
Results for the NC = 9 class LMD assessment indicate that WS-DNA may not be
suitable for identifying compromised devices when ≥ 9 devices of the same make and
model are present on the network. Due to the high similarity between Like-Model de-
vices, a compromised (authorized) device was incorrectly accepted ≥ 60% of the time
when falsely presenting credentials and %C ≥ 90% was not achieved using WS-DNA
fingerprint generated using Case B parameters.
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Figure 43. Classification Results for Device 1 compared to itself.
4.4 Thermal Cycling
This section presents the classification results for the CAN transceiver thermal
cycling as well as the verification results. All thermal cycling assessments were ac-
complished using the Case A (entire preamble) ROI. This section begins with a primer
for the reader to understand what MDA/ML results typically look like when a device
is compared to itself. The intent of MDA/ML is typically to maximize the correct
classification and maximize the True Verification Rate (TVR) and the Rogue Re-
jection Rate (RRR). The intent of the thermal cycling test was to utilize WS-DNA
fingerprints and MDA/ML to assess how much a device looks like itself during and
after thermal cycling. Success in this case should be defined as minimizing %C to ap-
proximately 1
NC
as well as minimizing the RRR between classes. In Figure 43, Device
1 was divided into two equal length classes, each composed of interleaved fingerprints.
As expected, %C is ≈ 50%, or a random guess, for all SNR’s. Rogue rejection rates
for a device presenting its own credentials can be observed in the NC = 4 class CLD
and NC = 9 class LMD assessments and are typically less than 25%.
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4.4.1 Classification.
The thermal cycling classification results are presented for two cases. The first
case examined is for the NC = 6 class that experienced cold and hot thermal cycling
and the second case examined is for the NC = 3 class that only experienced heat
cycling as outlined in Section 3.3.
4.4.1.1 6 Class Thermal Cycling.
Each of the NC = 6 classes is composed of bursts collected at different tempera-
tures as outlined in Section 3.3. The classification results are presented in Figure 44.
Classification results at SNRcol indicate that each class of the CAN transceiver looks
Figure 44. Classification Results for NC = 6 class thermal cycling problem. Each class
represents a collection at a different temperature.
Table 11. Confusion Matrix results for NC = 6 Class thermal cycling. Each class
represents a collection at a different temperature (or after different thermal cycling).
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6
Class 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
Class 2 0 99.72 0 0.04 0.24 0
Class 3 0 0 100 0 0 0
Class 4 0.36 0 0 96.16 3.48 0
Class 5 0 0.8 0 2.4 96.8 0
Class 6 0 0 0.04 0 0 99.96
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different at different temperatures. Class 2 (freezing) has statistically better classi-
fication from SNR∆ ≥ -54 dB SNR∆ = -28 dB and Class 1 (baseline 25 ◦C) had
statistically better classification from SNR∆ ≥ -22 dB to SNR∆ = -14 dB.
The confusion matrix results at SNRcol are presented in Table 11. There is al-
most no confusion between classes at this SNR with most of the confusion occurring
between Class 2, 4 and 5. This confusion may be a result of the wire configuration
for these collections as all wires were compressed in the refrigerator and oven used for
thermal cycling. There was almost no confusion between Class 1, Class 3 and Class
6 (all 25 ◦C) which may be attributed to environmental or collection bias since only
one collection was made per class for this assessment. Results are further assessed for
device similarity in the verification process.
Figure 45. NC = 3 class MDA/ML classification results. Each class was collected at
ambient temperature.
Table 12. Confusion Matrix results for NC = 3 Class thermal cycling. Each class
represents a collection at ambient temperature.
Class 1 Class2 Class 3
Class 1 100 0 0
Class 2 0 87.27 12.73
Class 3 0.07 15.29 84.44
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4.4.1.2 3 Class Thermal cycling.
NC = 3 Class thermal cycling classification results are presented in Figure 45 and
confusion matrix results are presented in Table 12. The purpose of this assessment is
to determine “tomorrow” how much this device looks like itself “yesterday and today”
after experiencing at least a 25 ◦C temperature change. The classification results at
SNRcol indicate that Class 1 looks completely different from Class 2 and 3 as it was
correctly classified %C = 100% of the time even though each class was collected at
25 ◦C. Class 2 and 3 look more similar to each other although %C ≥ 80% for both
which may result from additional hardware changes as the device continued to cool
between collections. These results imply that heat cycling does have an effect on the
fingerprints and the device does not look like itself after being heated. Verification
results provide an assessment of how similar Class 3 is to Class 1 and 2.
4.4.2 Verification.
Thermal cycling verification results are presented in this section for both the
NC = 6 and NC = 3 class assessment. Verification was accomplished to determine
how similar each class is before, during, and after thermal cycling.
4.4.2.1 6 Class Thermal Cycling.
Rogue Device ID verification was implemented for two cases for the NC = 6 class
problem; Case 1 included Class 6 in the model development and Case 2 excluded Class
6 from model development. Class 6 was used as a rogue class for each case to assess
which class it was most similar to. Figure 46 presents the rejection results when Class
6 is included in the model development and Figure 47 presents the results when Class 6
is excluded from model development. The results indicate that Class 6 had the highest
similarity to Class 3 with a RRR of 84% when Class 6 is presented as a true rogue class.
64
Figure 46. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A (entire preamble) using
Class 6 (included in model development) as the rogue class. Red X’s indicate access
incorrectly granted and blue circles indicate access correctly denied.
Figure 47. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A using Class 6 (excluded from
model development) as the rogue class. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and
blue circles indicate access correctly denied.
Class 1, 3, and 6 were all collected at an ambient temperature of approximately 25 ◦C.
Class 3 and 6 may not be similar to Class 1 due to wire configurations during collection
or potentially environmental bias. These results coupled with the classification results
indicate that fingerprints at different temperatures and after thermal cycling are not
similar.
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Figure 48. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A (entire preamble) using
Class 3 (included in model development) as the rogue class. Red X’s indicate access
incorrectly granted and blue circles indicate access correctly denied.
Figure 49. Rogue Device Verification at SNRcol for Case A using Class 3 (excluded from
model development) as the rogue class. Red X’s indicate access incorrectly granted and
blue circles indicate access correctly denied. Class 3 has a high similarity to Class 2.
4.4.2.2 3 Class Thermal Cycling.
Rogue rejection results are presented for two cases for the NC = 3 class thermal
cycling assessment; in Case 1, Class 3 is included in model development and in Case 2,
Class 3 is excluded from model development. All collections for this experiment were
taken at approximately 25 ◦C but Class 2 was collected after the device was heated
from ambient temperature to 50 ◦C and allowed to cool back down to ambient tem-
perature. Class 3 was collected ≈ 24 hours after Class 2 and experienced no thermal
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cycling or configuration changes. Results for both cases are presented in Figure 48
and 49 . These results indicate that Class 3 has some similarity to Class 2 and almost
no similarity to Class 1. When Class 3 is included in the model development, the
RRR is 82.8% when presenting Class 2 credentials. When Class 3 is excluded from
model development, only 23% of attempts were rejected indicating a high degree of
similarity. The classification and verification results for the NC = 3 class thermal
cycling problem indicate that the fingerprints do change when the CAN transceiver
is heated and allowed to cool back down. The average correct classification > 50%
for Class 2 and 3 indicate that the device looks different, but a RRR ≤ 25% indicate
the classes have some similarity to each other.
4.4.3 3 Class Cross Lot, Cross Temperature.
This section presents the cross class average correct classification for NC = 3 class
Cross Lot assessment. All devices were the same part number, two were from the
same lot and one was a different lot. All CAN transceivers were thermally cycled and
2Class 1 was collected using the same collection methodology presented in Section 3.3. Class
2-4 only consisted of one collection at each temperature and may have been subjected to additional
environmental bias.
Figure 50. Classification Results for NC = 3 class Cross Lot CAN transceivers across
multiple temperatures. %C improves during and after thermal cycling.2
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correct classification was assessed for 1) baseline 25 ◦C, 2) 50 ◦C, 3) 75 ◦C, and 4) 25
◦C after thermal cycling. The results for the cross class average correct classification
at all four temperatures are displayed in Figure 50. The maximum %C achieved
for the baseline 25 ◦C collection was ≈ 90% at SNRcol but there was almost no
confusion between the three devices at 50 ◦C, 75 ◦C, and at 25 ◦C once the devices
were cooled following thermal cycling. The cross class average results after thermal
cycling at 25 ◦C are statistically better than the baseline 25 ◦C results at SNR∆ ≥
-48 dB. Classification results at elevated temperatures indicate that devices are even
more dissimilar because %C does not reach 1/NC , or a random guess, within the same
SNR∆ range as the ambient temperature classes. These results may also indicate that
although each device does not look like itself at different temperatures as previously
shown in Figure 44 and 45, there are still features exclusive to each device that allow
for correct classification when presented with fingerprints from another device that
also has an elevated temperature. These results are not definitive but warrant further
investigation into the effects of temperature on device discrimination.
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V. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter provides a summary and conclusion for the results obtained from
Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) fingerprint discrimination of Elec-
tronic Control Units. A summary of this research and its applications is provided in
Section 5.1. This section also provides a summary of device classification and verifica-
tion for the Cross Lot Discrimination (CLD) and Like Model Discrimination (LMD)
and conclusions for the preliminary investigation of temperature effects on finger-
printing and discrimination. Lastly, possible extensions to this research are presented
in Section 5.2.
5.1 Research Summary
As automobiles become more connected and autonomous with the use of techno-
logically advanced ECUs, the need for establishing network security becomes more
imminent. Hackers have proven that they can incapacitate vehicles by compromising
authorized ECUs or by installing rogue devices on the network [13, 20, 31]. Because
most vehicles contain electronic controls and embedded systems on a network, this
threat is not limited to automobiles but may extend to heavy vehicles, ships, and
tanks. This research showed that WS-DNA discrimination is a viable solution for
ECU classification and verification. Although development boards like the Ardunio
and Beagle Board are able to simulate ECUs, the differences in the transition regions
and the amplitudes provide enough information to reject these devices when com-
pared to authorized ECUs. Using only the message preamble of an ECU for NC = 4
class CLD and NC = 9 class LMD, 100% of the rogue attempts to access the network
were denied for three different rogue devices. Using a different Steering Angle Sensor
as a compromised device resulted in > 99% rogue rejection for the CLD and > 95% of
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rogue attempts were denied for the LMD problem. Additionally, the average correct
classification of the NC = 4 devices was ≥ 90 % at SNR∆ = -8 dB and %C = 99% was
achieved at SNRcol. Classification results were lower for the LMD, a maximum %C
= 90% was achieved at SNRcol. As expected, using only the seven bits as the ROI in
Case B, classification and verification performance was statistically worse than Case
A. The average correct classification %C was reduced by ≈ 3% at SNRcol although
the average RRR for compromised devices was approximately the same for the Case
B CLD assessment. LMD classification results for Case B failed to achieve %C =
90% but the average compromised device rejection rate was still ≥ 89%. Even with
decreased overall performance, rogue rejection was still 100% for Case B indicating
that WS-DNA is suitable to authenticate base frame format ECUs and results look
promising for use with extended frame format ECUs based on the results for Case A.
5.1.1 Thermal Effects.
Results from the thermal cycling indicate that fingerprints do change as devices
experience temperature variations. Within the NC = 6 class cross temperature assess-
ment, %C ≈ 100% at SNRcol, clearly indicating differences in classes. While NC = 3
class ambient temperature assessment collection accounted for possible environmental
and collection bias, average %C ≈ 91% with no misclassification between the baseline
Class 1 and Class 2 or Class 3. The confusion between Class 2 and Class 3 indicates
some similarity but also may indicate that the device continued to changed as it was
cooled down.
Although each device looked different after experiencing thermal cycling, the
NC = 3 CAN transceivers assessment achieved %C ≈ 100% at elevated tempera-
tures and once each device cooled back down to ambient temperature.
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5.2 Future Work
This section provides some potential future extensions to WS-DNA applications
for ECUs on the CAN bus.
5.2.1 Alternate Classifiers.
Alternate classifiers such as Random Forest (RndF) or Generalized Relevance
Learning Vector Quantization Improved (GRLVQI) could be used to compare dis-
crimination performance to Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML).
5.2.1.1 Dimensionality Reduction.
Both Case A and Case B produced a large amount of features for WS-DNA but
these features can be reduced. A thorough dimensional reduction analysis (DRA)
study could be used to assess classification performance using reduced feature sets.
RndF and GRLVQI can be used to accomplish DRA and compare reduced feature
classification performance to MDA/ML classification performance[32, 33]. Addition-
ally, RndF can be used to examine the features created during thermal cycling in
order to eliminate the temperature dependent features from each class. Following
dimensional reduction, a CMD or LMD assessment could be accomplished to deter-
mine if the reduced feature set used to eliminate temperature dependence could also
be used to achieve device discrimination.
5.2.2 Additional CAN bus DNA Applications.
WS-DNA can be applied to a wider range of CAN bus and ECU discrimination
problems. A different fingerprinting methodology, Slope-Based Frequency Shift Key-
ing (SB-FSK), could provide better device discrimination because additional bits in
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transient, or variant, regions could be used to generate fingerprints [27]. Examining
ECU discrimination for extended frame format ECUs could be useful and potentially
validate the claims for Case A. Additionally, discriminating ECUs with different func-
tions on the same vehicle such as a Steering Angle Sensor, an Engine Control Module,
and a telematic control unit could be useful. Lastly, LMD and CMD assessments could
be performed using only the CAN-Hi or only the CAN-Lo signals.
5.2.3 ECU Measurement Message Jitter.
Many of the ECUs in automobiles are designed to provide measurements of met-
rics such as engine RPM, angle of the steering sensor, or temperature. During the
SAS burst extraction, it was discovered that the even though all sensors were locked
and transmitted the same message, there was some intermittent message jitter, or
change, observed in every device. The two older devices had the most observed jitter
indicating that this phenomenon may be used for device identification or potentially
to identify aging or imminent failure of devices.
72
Bibliography
1. —–. https://store.arduino.cc/arduino-uno-rev3, 2016.
2. Avatefipour, O., Tayyab, M., Hafeez, A., and Malik, H. Linking Re-
ceived Packet to the Transmitter Through Physical-Fingerprinting of Controller
Area Network. In Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (2017), pp. 1–
6.
3. Carbino, T. J. Exploitation of Unintentional Ethernet Cable Emissions Us-
ing Constellation Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Fingerprints to En-
hance Network Security. PhD thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2015.
4. Carbino, T. J., Temple, M. A., and Bihl, T. J. Ethernet card discrimina-
tion using unintentional cable emissions and constellation-based fingerprinting.
2015 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications,
ICNC 2015 (2015), 369–373.
5. Carbino, T. J., Temple, M. A., and Lopez, J. A Comparison of PHY-
Based Fingerprinting Methods Used to Enhance Network Access Control. In IFIP
Advances in Information and Communication Technology (2015), pp. 204–217.
6. Carbino, T. J., Temple, M. A., and Lopez, J. Conditional Constellation
Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting for Network Device
Authentication. In 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications,
ICC 2016 (2016), pp. 1–6.
7. Cho, K.-t., and Shin, K. G. Fingerprinting Electronic Control Units for
Vehicle Intrusion Detection. In USENIX Security Symposium (2016), pp. 911–
927.
8. Choi, W., Jo, H. J., Woo, S., Chun, J. Y., Park, J., and Lee, D. H.
Identifying ECUs through Inimitable Characteristics of Signals in Controller Area
Networks. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 67, 6 (2018), 4757–4770.
9. Cobb, W. E., Garcia, E. W., Temple, M. A., Baldwin, R. O., and
Kim, Y. C. Physical Layer Identification of Embedded Devices Using RF-DNA
Fingerprinting. In IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM (2010),
pp. 2168–2173.
10. Cobb, W. E., Laspe, E. D., Baldwin, R. O., Temple, M. A., and Kim,
Y. C. Intrinsic Physical-Layer Authentication of Integrated Circuits. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 7, 1 (2012), 14–24.
11. Coley, G. BeagleBone Black System Reference Manual - A4. 239.
73
12. Corrigan, S. Introduction to the Controller Area Network (CAN). Tech. Rep.
August 2002, 2002.
13. Currie, R. Developments in Car Hacking, SANS Reading Room, 2015.
14. Currie, R. Hacking the CAN Bus: Basic Manipulation of a Modern Automobile
Through CAN Bus Reverse Engineering, SANS Reading Room, 2017.
15. Dadour, I. R., Almanjahie, I., Fowkes, N. D., Keady, G., and Vijayan,
K. Temperature variations in a parked vehicle. Forensic Science International
(2011).
16. Erniotti. CAN Bus frame, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CAN-
Bus-frame in base format without stuffbits.svg, 2018.
17. Evenchick, E. An Open-Source USB to CAN Adapter, https://canable.io,
2017.
18. Gerdes, R. M., Daniels, T. E., Mina, M., and Russell, S. F. Device
Identification via Analog Signal Fingerprinting: A Matched Filter Approach. 14th
Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2004),
78.
19. Gerdes, Ryan M; Mina, Mani; Russell, S. F. Physical-Layer Identification
of Wired Ethernet Devices. IEEE Trans on Information Forensics and Security
7 7, 4 (2012), 1339–1353.
20. Greenberg, A. Hackers Remotely Kill A Jeep On The Highway With Me In
It, Wired, https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway,
2015.
21. Harmer, P. K., Williams, M. D., and Temple, M. A. Using DE-optimized
LFS processing to enhance 4G communication security. In Proceedings - Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, ICCCN (2011),
pp. 1–8.
22. Jaynes, M., Dantu, R., Varriale, R., and Evans, N. Automating ECU
Identification for Vehicle Security. In 2016 15th IEEE International Conference
on Machine Learning and Applications, ICMLA 2016 (2017), pp. 632–635.
23. Klein, R., Temple, M., Mendenhall, M., Reising, D. Sensitivity Analysis
of Burst Detection and RF Fingerprinting Classification Performance. In 2009
IEEE International Conference on Communications (2009), pp. 1–5.
24. Kraus, D., Leitgeb, E., Plank, T., and Löschnigg, M. Replacement
of the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol for future automotive bus sys-
tem solutions by substitution via optical networks. International Conference on
Transparent Optical Networks 2016-Augus (2016), 1–8.
74
25. Lassiter, R. M., Graham, S. R., Carbino, T. J., and Dunlap, S. J. Elec-
tronic Control Unit discrimination using Wired Signal Distinct Native Attributes
(WS-DNA). In International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures
Security (2019), pp. 1–20, Under Review.
26. Lopez, J. Enhanced Industrial Control System (ICS) and Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security for ISA99 Level-0 Using Field Device
Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Fingerprints. Doctoral disser-
tation, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2016.
27. Lopez, J., Liefer, N. C., Busho, C. R., and Temple, M. A. Enhancing
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Level-0 Physical Process Se-
curity Using Field Device Distinct Native Attribute Features. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security 13, 5 (2018), 1215–1229.
28. Lukacs, M., Collins, P., and Temple, M. Device Identification Using Ac-
tive Noise Interrogation and RF-DNA Fingerprinting for Non-Destructive Am-
plifier Acceptance Testing. In 2016 IEEE 17th Annual Wireless and Microwave
Technology Conference, WAMICON 2016 (2016), pp. 2–7.
29. Marchetti, M., and Stabili, D. Anomaly detection of CAN bus messages
through analysis of ID sequences. IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium, Proceed-
ings, 4 (2017), 1577–1583.
30. Murvay, P., and Groza, B. Source Identification Using Signal Characteristics
in Controller Area Networks. IEEE Signal Processing Letters 21, 4 (2014), 395–
399.
31. Paganini, P. CAN Hacking Tools, 20 USD to hack a car remotely, 2014.
32. Patel, H. J., Temple, M. A., and Baldwin, R. O. Improving ZigBee
device network authentication using ensemble decision tree classifiers with radio
frequency distinct native attribute fingerprinting. IEEE Transactions on Relia-
bility 64, 1 (2015), 221–233.
33. Reising, D. R., Temple, M. A., and Jackson, J. A. Authorized and
Rogue Device Discrimination Using Dimensionally Reduced RF-DNA Finger-
prints. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 10, 6 (2015),
1180–1192.
34. Reising, D. R., Temple, M. A., and Oxley, M. E. Gabor-based RF-DNA
fingerprinting for classifying 802.16e WiMAX Mobile Subscribers. In 2012 In-
ternational Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)
(2012), pp. 7–13.
35. Ross, B., Carbino, T. J., and Temple, M. A. Simulcasted Power Line
Communication Network (SPN) Configuration Validation for Home Automation
75
Applications Using Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Finger-
printing. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and
Security, ICCWS 2017 3312, 2017 (2017), 313–322.
36. Ross, B. P., Carbino, T. J., and Stone, S. J. Physical-Layer discrimination
of Power Line Communications. In 2017 International Conference on Computing,
Networking and Communications, ICNC 2017 (2017), pp. 341–345.
37. Suski II, W. C., Temple, M. A., Mendenhall, M., and Mills, R. Radio
frequency fingerprinting commercial communication devices to enhance electronic
security. International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics 1, 3
(Jan 2008), 301–322.
38. Texas Instruments. Isolated CAN Transceiver - ISO1050. Datasheet, June
2009 (2009), 33.
39. Williams, M. D., Munns, S. A., Temple, M. A., and Mendenhall,
M. J. RF-DNA Fingerprinting for Airport WiMax Communications Security. In
2010 4th International Conference on Network and System Security, NSS 2010
(2010), pp. 32–39.
40. Williams, M. D., Temple, M. A., and Reising, D. R. Augmenting
Bit-Level Network Security Using Physical Layer RF-DNA Fingerprinting. In
GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (2010), pp. 1–6.
76
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704–0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704–0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection
of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD–MM–YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From — To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)




16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:






19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
03–21–2019 Master’s Thesis Sept 2017 — Mar 2019
Physical Layer Discrimination of Electronic Control Units Using Wired
Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Fingerprints
18G230
Rahn M. Lassiter, Capt, USAF
Air Force Institute of Technology












APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a communication system used in automobiles to connect the electronic
components required for critical vehicle operations. These components are called Electronic Control Units (ECU) and
each one exercises one or more functions within the vehicle. ECUs can provide autonomous safety features and increased
comfort to drivers but these advancements may come at the expense of vehicle security. Researchers have shown that the
CAN bus can be hacked by compromising authorized ECUs or by physically connecting unauthorized devices to the bus.
Physical layer (PHY) device fingerprinting has emerged as one of the accepted approaches to establishing vehicle security.
This paper uses a fingerprinting method called Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) and classification
algorithm called Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) to achieve ECU discrimination which
includes device classification and verification.
Device Discrimination, Distinct Native Attribute
U U U UU 94
Dr. Scott R. Graham, AFIT/ENG
(937) 255-3636, x4581; scott.graham@afit.edu
